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Abstract
Future generations of processors will exhibit an in-
crease of faults over their lifetime, and it becomes
increasingly expensive to solve the resulting reliabil-
ity issues purely at the hardware level. We propose
to model computations in terms of restartable task
graphs in order to improve reliability at the software
level. As a proof of concept, we present Cobra, a novel
design for a shared-memory work-stealing scheduler
that realizes this notion of restartable task graphs,
and enables computations to survive hardware fail-
ures due to soft errors. A comparison with the work-
stealing scheduler of Threading Building Blocks on
the PARSEC benchmark suite shows that Cobra in-
curs no performance overhead in the absence of fail-
ures, and low performance overheads in the presence
of single and multiple failures.
1 Introduction
Due to extreme reduction in scale, future generations
of processors will exhibit an increase of software-
visible failures, and handling such failures at the
hardware level becomes increasingly expensive in
terms of hardware complexity and energy consump-
tion [4,11,13,28]. Therefore, it is necessary to inves-
tigate how existing hardware solutions can be com-
plemented at the software level [9, 13,14,30].
Software solutions for such reliability issues already
exist primarily in the field of high-performance com-
puting, where the state of the art is based on check-
pointing strategies. However, checkpointing alone is
predicted to become infeasible in the future because
of the large overhead and high checkpoint frequency
necessitated by ever decreasing mean times between
failures [5, 6, 11,13].
As a novel approach, we propose to model compu-
tations in terms of restartable task graphs to improve
reliability at the software level, above the hardware,
but below a more costly checkpointing infrastructure.
A failure that occurs during the execution of a task
graph can be isolated by identifying a correspond-
ing subgraph whose re-execution fixes the cause of
the failure and allows the remaining task graph to be
completed successfully. In this way, the failure can be
isolated and its impact on the running software min-
imized. Only if a failure-correcting subgraph cannot
be identified, does the failure need to be reported to
the next level of the software resilience stack, for ex-
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ample as a trigger for a checkpoint rollback recovery.
As a proof of concept that realizes this notion of
restartable task graphs we present Cobra, a novel
design for a shared-memory work-stealing sched-
uler. Unlike traditional work-stealing approaches,
Cobra maintains an explicit representation of the
tree-shaped graph generated by a fork/join compu-
tation. In the presence of soft errors, it can selec-
tively re-execute tasks to identify a failure-correcting
subtree that implicitly fixes the cause of the failure,
provided computations are expressed as idempotent
algorithms. A comparison with Threading Building
Blocks on the PARSEC benchmark suite shows that
a C++11 implementation of Cobra incurs no perfor-
mance overhead in the absence of failures, and low
performance overheads in the presence of single and
multiple failures.
2 Restartable task graphs for
resilience
2.1 Faults and failures
Faults are anomalies at the hardware level that may
or may not give rise to failures, such as silent er-
rors, crashes or hangs. For example, alpha particles
and cosmic rays may cause spontaneous bit flips in
memory, and may give rise to soft errors, i.e., wrong
memory contents, which may cause computations to
return incorrect results, make pointers refer to ille-
gal memory addresses, or invalidate termination con-
ditions in loops [26]. Error-correcting code memory
(ECC) can prevent soft errors, but only up to a cer-
tain number of simultaneous bit flips in a memory
region. Since in future hardware, the number of bit
flips is expected to rise significantly due to extreme
reduction in scale, the rate of software-visible failures
will increase, and thus software solutions to improve
resilience become necessary [4, 10].
2.2 Requirements
The goal of our approach is to isolate failures and
to minimize their impact on the running software as
much as possible. Our key insight is that we need
a runtime infrastructure with a light-weight mecha-
nism that restarts only a relatively small number of
isolated, fine-grained software tasks as a reaction to a
failure. This contrasts with checkpoint/restart tech-
niques where with uncoordinated strategies at least
one or more, and with coordinated strategies even all
involved compute nodes need to be restarted from a
checkpoint previously written to secondary storage,
which implies high costs in terms of writing check-
points, downtime, coordination, and recovery.
We can envision several options for runtime in-
frastructures that allow for fine-grained tasks to be
restarted. We propose the following design space to
differentiate between the possible solutions.
2.2.1 Explicit tasks and dependencies
In order to know what tasks to restart in the pres-
ence of failures, these tasks have to be explicitly rep-
resented, or it must be possible to reliably recon-
struct them. Moreover, if a task that needs restarting
impacts other, dependent tasks, such dependencies
need to be explicitly represented, or reliably recon-
structable, as well.
2.2.2 Fault-detection mechanism
Task restarts need to be triggered when a hardware
failure occurs, and there must be a minimum likeli-
hood that such restarts fix the cause of the failure,
so that the computation has a chance to successfully
complete. Therefore, a mechanism is needed that en-
ables software to both recognize and fix failures. This
mechanism depends on the fault model one wishes to
tackle. In this paper, we focus on soft errors, es-
pecially multi-bit flips in memory. Other hardware
faults that can be fixed through task restarts may in-
clude communication faults, logic faults, and so on.
2.2.3 Task restart mechanism
A mechanism is needed that manages the task
restarts. This includes identifying the task and/or
subgraph of the task graph that needs to be restarted
in order to fix the cause of a particular hardware fail-
ure. For example with soft errors, a failure may man-
ifest itself in the form of a segmentation fault when
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dereferencing an invalid pointer, but the task that
can fix the cause of the failure by assigning a valid
address to the pointer variable may only occur higher
up in the task graph. Tasks that depend on the iden-
tified task to be restarted may be in need of restarting
as well as a consequence of that restart. It must also
be ensured that task restarts do not alter the result
of the overall computation. This is a non-trivial re-
quirement, especially when task graphs can modify
(i.e., read and write, instead of only either read or
write) shared memory.
2.3 The Cobra Approach
The requirements stated above for restartable task
graph runtimes leave a lot of room for concrete real-
izations. In principle, it would be desirable to design
such an infrastructure for task graphs with arbitrary
dependencies. However, it is known that schedul-
ing arbitrary task graphs is NP-complete, even if the
task graphs are static and compute times are known
in advance [31]. Although efficient heuristics and ap-
proximations exist for static task graphs with known
compute times [23], we expect that restarting tasks
and/or subgraphs due to hardware failures at runtime
will have a non-trivial impact on such schedulers for
arbitrary task graphs.
On the other hand, fully strict computations,
which can be expressed with fork/join primitives,
yield tree-shaped graphs for which work stealing is
known to create efficient schedules on the fly, with
provably optimal time and space bounds [3]. In prac-
tice, work stealing has been shown to be effective for
example for spawn/sync in Cilk [15], spawn/wait in
Threading Building Blocks (TBB) [27], untied tasks
in OpenMP [12], Java fork/join [24], and async/finish
in Habanero and X10 [8]. We therefore opted to ini-
tially focus on the combination of fork/join compu-
tations with work stealing as well.
The result is Cobra, a novel resilience-aware
work-stealing scheduler for fully strict tree-recursive
fork/join computations. The remainder of this sec-
tion shows how Cobra realizes the above require-
ments, while Section 3 describes Cobra in more detail.
2.3.1 Explicit tasks and dependencies
Existing work-stealing schedulers optimize away the
tree structure of fork/join computations as much
as possible, by removing tasks from work-stealing
queues as early as possible, and using the native ex-
ecution stack as far as possible. As a consequence,
tasks that need to be restarted because of failures
are usually already gone, and reconstructing them
is difficult. Cobra represents every task by a node
in an explicit representation of the fork/join tree in-
stead, which maintains references to its children and
to its join continuation. This tree data structure dif-
fers substantially from implicit task representations
in already existing work-stealing schedulers.
2.3.2 Fault-detection mechanism
Recent processors by Intel and AMD have integrated
a machine check architecture, which reports cor-
rected, fatal, and software-recoverable faults to the
operating system [1,19]. In the case of soft errors, the
machine check architecture can mark memory with
bit flips that ECC memory cannot recover from as
poisoned. If the software tries to consume poisoned
memory, the hardware throws a machine check ex-
ception instead, and by doing so, gives the operat-
ing system a chance to recover. For example, Linux
since kernel version 2.6.x deals with some of these
hardware-level exceptions transparently, for example
by invalidating caches that contain poisoned data. It
also reports some of these exceptions as signals to
processes when they attempt to consume poisoned
memory, and thus gives applications a chance to re-
cover in turn [20,21].
Cobra uses such data poisoning as its fault-
detection mechanism. The tree structure of a
fork/join computation allows the scheduler to detect
a task that fails due to a read access to poisoned
memory, and to trigger its re-execution. If that task
performs a write access to the poisoned memory lo-
cation, and thus “unpoisons” it before another read
access to the same memory location occurs, the re-
mainder of the computation can succeed. If that task
continues to fail, the scheduler can select nodes higher
up in the tree for re-execution, until the necessary un-
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poisoning write access is performed by a subtree that
allows the overall computation to succeed.1
A fork/join computation may not unpoison a poi-
soned memory location, that is, it may not write to
such a memory location anymore after it gets cor-
rupted. If the computation also does not read from
such a poisoned memory location anymore either, the
soft error escapes from the fork/join computation. In
that case, Cobra cannot recover, and later accesses
to escaped poisoned memory locations need to rely
on a more costly resilience mechanism higher up in
the software stack, such as checkpointing. However,
Cobra may still significantly reduce the number of
soft errors that escape from fork/join computations,
which can help to reduce the frequency, and thus the
cost of checkpointing.
2.3.3 Task restart mechanism
In work-stealing schedulers, task execution is dis-
tributed over several worker threads that operate on
the fork/join computation in parallel by executing
the same scheduling loop. Cobra integrates the mon-
itoring and rescheduling of failed nodes as part of the
scheduling loop. We discuss the details in Section 3.
To ensure that restarts do not alter the result of
the overall computation expressed by a fork/join tree,
Cobra requires tasks to be expressed as idempotent
algorithms, where identifiable steps may be executed
more than once without producing different results
than when executed exactly once. The primary rea-
son for an algorithm not to be idempotent is when
it uses assignment statements that both read from
and write to the same memory location. For exam-
ple, x = x + 1 is not idempotent, because n execu-
tions will increment x by n, not by 1 as intended.
Purely functional programs are by definition idempo-
1The current design of the machine check architecture for
x86 processors does not support unpoisoning of memory loca-
tions by itself, because it typically marks larger regions, of the
size of a cache line or memory page, as poisoned, and does not
support partially poisoned regions. However, a separate layer
on top of the machine check architecture, which remaps poi-
soned memory and intercepts memory accesses to such regions
by way of memory page protection, can provide the necessary
unpoisoning of memory in software, without affecting accesses
to other, unpoisoned regions.
struct node_type {
parent;
children;
task;
continuation;
state;
}
void fork(node, task) {
child = new node_type;
child.parent = node;
child.task = task;
child.children = empty;
child.continuation = empty;
child.state = free;
node.children.add(child);
}
void join(node, continuation) {
node.continuation = continuation;
}
Figure 1: Representation of nodes in Cobra.
tent, but a wide class of imperative algorithms, such
as the benchmarks we use to validate Cobra in Sec-
tion 4, can also be expressed in an idempotent style.
This is also in line with previous observations [22,25].
3 Design of Cobra
This section discusses the design of Cobra: how the
fork/join tree is represented; how the scheduling loop
executes user code and enables it to dynamically
build the fork/join tree; and how the scheduling loop
monitors failed tasks and restarts subtrees to fix such
failures.
3.1 Representation
In Cobra, the fork/join tree is created from nodes.
Fig. 1 shows an abstract definition of such nodes.
Each node has the following attributes:
• a reference to its parent in the tree (the root
node has an empty parent reference);
• a children container with references to one or
more child nodes (leaves have empty children
containers);
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void qsort(array, start, end) {
if (start < end) {
pivot = partition(array, start, end));
fork(node, qsort(array, start, pivot));
fork(node, qsort(array, pivot+1, end));
join(node, merge(array, start, pivot, end));
}
}
Figure 2: Parallel quicksort in terms of fork/join.
• task/continuation references provided by user
code;2
• a state, which can be one of free, busy, and done,
and in the presence of failures, can additionally
be inactive.
The fork/join tree gets constructed during execu-
tion of an algorithm. The operation fork (Fig. 1)
creates a new child node; assigns the parent and task
references as provided by arguments; initializes chil-
dren and continuation to empty, and state to free as
default values; and adds the new child to the children
container of the parent node. The operation join just
assigns the continuation attribute.
Fig. 2 shows pseudo-code for a parallel quicksort
in terms of fork/join operations as an example: The
function qsort operates on an array on the region
defined by start and end. If the region is not empty,
it partitions the array and determines a new pivot
element. It then forks invocations of qsort for the
left and the right partitions, which can be executed
in parallel. It finally specifies an invocation of merge
as the join continuation.3
Note that fork and join do not immediately ex-
ecute user code provided in task and continuation.
This is the responsibility of the scheduling loop, de-
tailed in Section 3.2.
2Cobra uses lambda expressions to represent tasks and con-
tinuations, but task/continuation objects like in Java fork/join
or TBB could also be used.
3Definitions for partition and merge are not shown here.
We leave it open how the current node is determined on which
fork and join are invoked. For example, the current node can
be passed as an argument to a forked lambda expression, or it
can be bound to a thread-local variable.
Busy Inactive
Done
Free
start
end
claim free node
execute task
steal free node
execute task
[thread failing]
claim inactive node
execute task
              execute continuation
Figure 3: The life cycle of a Cobra node.
The scheduling loop is also responsible for perform-
ing the state transitions in a node, depicted in Fig. 3:
Each node starts in state free. When a worker thread
claims or steals a node, it executes its task, creating
its children and continuation, if any, and then tran-
sitions its state to busy. In failure-free execution, the
continuation of a node is executed when all its chil-
dren are done, and its state then transitions to done
as well. In the presence of failures, the state of a node
may transition from busy to inactive. It can then be
reclaimed, which eventually transitions its state back
to busy.
3.2 Failure-free execution
In Cobra, like in other work-stealing schedulers, the
scheduling and execution of tasks and continuations
is distributed over several worker threads. Each
thread owns a working list of nodes that it is re-
sponsible for, and executes the same scheduling loop.
Unlike in other work-stealing schedulers, the nodes
that are stored in Cobra’s working lists are already
claimed by the corresponding worker thread and can-
not be stolen by other threads. Only children of such
nodes can be claimed or stolen in Cobra.
The flow of the scheduling loop in each worker
thread is depicted in Fig. 4, with the filled circle be-
ing the starting point. Assume that a fork/join com-
putation starts with one working list containing the
root node, and all other working lists being empty.
Further assume that the root node’s task is already
executed, and thus the children references and con-
tinuation of the root node are already defined.
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If the working list of the current worker thread is
empty, the thread attempts to steal a node from an-
other worker thread (see below). If the working list
is not empty (for example, when it contains the root
node), the worker thread selects a node N from its
working list.
If the parent of N is inactive, the node is re-
moved from the working list and the scheduling loop
is restarted. In failure-free execution, nodes are never
inactive, so we skip this case until Section 3.3.
If a child C of N is in state free, the worker thread
can claim it, execute its task, set its state to busy, and
enter it into its working list. The scheduling loop is
then restarted. If no child of N is free, the worker
thread tries to claim an inactive child instead, which
we discuss in the next subsection.
If no child of N can be claimed, then either all
children are done, or some children are busy. If all
children are done (including when there are no chil-
dren), the worker thread executes the continuation
of N, removes N from the working list, sets the state
of N to done, and restarts the scheduling loop. If not
all children are done, which means that some chil-
dren are busy, and there are more other nodes in the
working list, another node N is selected for inspec-
tion. If after inspecting all nodes in the working list,
the scheduling loop has not been restarted, then all
nodes in the working list have busy children, and the
worker thread attempts to steal a node from another
worker thread.
When a worker thread attempts to steal a node,
it chooses another victim thread at random, and
searches for a free child of any node in the victim’s
working list. A steal attempt may fail, when a vic-
tim’s working list contains no nodes or no children,
or when no child of any node in the victim’s working
list is free. In case the thief’s working list is empty,
the thief will make more steal attempts, potentially
from other victims, until it successfully steals a node.
If the thief’s working list is not empty, it continues
by inspecting the nodes in its own working list, to
ensure their progress. A worker thread attempts to
steal nodes even if its own working list is not empty,
to improve overall progress and avoid idling as much
as possible when all children of all nodes in its own
working list are busy.
Claim free child C ?
Remove N from
working ListYes
No
No
Select node N
Execute continuation of N
mark N as doneYes
Working list 
empty ?
No
Yes
Steal child node C ?
Yes
execute task of C
mark C as busy
add C to working list
No
Yes
Yes
All children 
done ?
No
Reinitialize C Yes
Claim inactive 
child C ?
More nodes ?
Parent inactive ?
No
No
Figure 4: The scheduling loop of Cobra. Grey boxes
deal with nodes that are inactive due to failures.
Observe that only a busy node can enter a working
list, after its task has been executed, and therefore
its children, if any, and its continuation, if any, have
been created. Furthermore, a node is only removed
from a working list after its children are all done,
its continuation has been executed, and its state has
been set to done as well.
3.3 Distributed node monitoring
The previous subsection focuses on the failure-free ex-
ecution of the scheduling loop in Fig. 4. As outlined
in Section 2.3, Cobra’s fault model is based on soft er-
rors, and more specifically on data poisoning: When
either user code or a worker thread itself attempts to
consume poisoned memory, the thread executing that
attempt receives a machine check exception. In reac-
tion, it sets the state of all nodes in its working list to
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inactive, reinitializes its working list and other data
structures relevant for the scheduler, and restarts its
scheduling loop with an empty working list. As a
consequence, nodes that become inactive due to such
a failure are not referenced in any working list any-
more and need to be reclaimed. We decided against
keeping track of the particular node whose execution
caused the failure in order not to penalize computa-
tions that do not encounter any soft errors, which are
still rare events.
The flow diagram in Fig. 4 depicts three boxes that
deal with inactive Cobra nodes, highlighted in grey:
• After a node N is selected for inspection when a
working list is not empty, it is checked whether
the state of the node’s parent reference has be-
come inactive as a reaction to a machine check
exception. In that case, N is no longer relevant
because it will eventually be recreated as part of
the re-execution of the top-most inactive parent
of N.
• If a worker thread cannot claim a free child of N
in the next step, it then checks whether a child C
of N is in state inactive. If so, it claims it, reini-
tializes its children and continuation to empty,
re-executes its task, sets its state to busy, and en-
ters it into its working list. Recall that executing
a task allows user code to invoke fork and join
in order to redefine children and continuation,
which implictly reconstructs the failed subtree.
The scheduling loop is then restarted.
We do not allow an inactive node to be stolen. This
ensures that it can only be restarted by the thread
working on its parent node. If this does not unpoi-
son the problematic memory location, the restarted
node is likely to fail again. This triggers a failure
in that worker thread, and thus sets the state of the
parent node to inactive as well, which in turn can
only be restarted by the thread working on the par-
ent node’s parent, and so on. This ensures that a
failure percolates up the fork/join tree until it is ei-
ther fixed, if necessary by restarting the complete tree
from its root node; or else, it gets reported as a fail-
ure of the overall computation, to be handled by a
more costly resilience mechanism higher up in the
software stack. Note that an inactive node is not
claimed again in case its parent node is also inactive.
In that case, there is, however, a top-most inactive
node in the transitive closure of the parent relation,
which is eventually claimed by the thread working on
its active parent.
Cobra is effectively a trampoline-style scheduler:
Every invocation of user code through fork and join
returns to the scheduling loop, which can in turn ex-
ecute available nodes, execute enabled join continu-
ations, check for liveness of parents and children of
nodes stored in its working list, drop children of in-
active parents, and reschedule inactive child nodes.
Cobra survives failures that occur in user code be-
cause nodes are only modified when worker threads
are responsible for them after successful claim or steal
attempts. The node’s state is eventually changed to
done, but only when it is completely finished, after
executing its continuation. If the thread responsible
for the node fails at any stage before, the state is not
set to done, and the worker thread responsible for the
node’s parent can take over.
3.4 Implementation details
In Cobra, multiple worker threads may attempt to ac-
cess the same Cobra node in parallel. This requires
synchronization to avoid data races. To avoid un-
necessary locking overheads, our implementation is
based on a lock-free protocol using atomic compare-
and-swap operations. This is possible because of
the partial monotonicity of state transitions in Co-
bra nodes: A node can only ever change from free to
busy, from busy to inactive and back in the presence
of failures, and from busy to done (Fig. 3).
The simplest case is when a worker thread tries
to claim a free node locally which, when success-
ful, changes the state of the node to busy. This
is expressed in the Cobra implementation by way
of an atomic compare-and-swap operation (CAS), as
shown in the pseudo-code in Fig. 5. The operation
try free node checks whether a node is free and in
case it is, performs the transition to state busy in
one atomic step. This use of an atomic compare-and-
swap operation prevents more than one thread from
successfully claiming the same free node at the same
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boolean try_free_node (node) {
if (CAS(node.state, free => busy)) {
execute node.task;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Figure 5: Locally claiming a free Cobra node.
boolean try_inactive_node (node) {
if (node.state is inactive) {
node.version = node.version+1;
write_barrier;
node.state = busy;
node.children = empty;
node.continuation = empty;
execute node.task;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Figure 6: Locally claiming an inactive Cobra node.
time. In case the comparison fails, another thread
has already claimed the node, or the node may even
already be done. In case try free node successfully
claims a node, it executes the node’s task, filling the
node’s children and continuation attributes, if any,
and reports to the scheduling loop that the claim is
indeed successful.
Another way to claim a node locally is when a
worker thread tries to claim it as an inactive node.
The corresponding operation try inactive node is
shown in Fig. 6. It first checks whether the given
node is inactive and if this is the case, also performs
a transition to state busy. Here, the check and state
transition is not combined into an atomic operation,
because the only thread trying to claim an inactive
node is the worker thread that is responsible for that
node’s parent, to ensure percolation of repeated fail-
ures. The state transition is performed by assign-
ment instead, followed by a reinitialization of the
children and continuation attributes, and execution
of the node’s task.
boolean steal_free_node (node) {
for each child in node.children {
if (CAS(child.state, free => busy)) {
if (node.version <= child.version) {
execute node.task;
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Figure 7: Remotely stealing a free Cobra node.
Recall that we must be able to recognize whether
the parent of a node is inactive or not in the
scheduling loop (see Fig. 4). However, the
try inactive node operation may reset the state of
such a parent from inactive to busy, which may lead
a thread operating on the child node to falsely believe
that its parent is still valid.
To avoid this situation, our Cobra implementation
adds a version number as an additional attribute to
the node type. The root node is initialized with 0 as
its version number, whereas a child node is assigned
the version from its parent when it is created by a
fork operation.
When a worker thread successfully claims an inac-
tive node, it first increments the version number of
that node before it performs any other operations on
it (see Fig. 6). A memory barrier instructs compiler
and processor to ensure that these two steps are seen
by other threads exactly in that order. This ensures
the following invariant: The version of a valid node
is always greater than or equal to the version of its
parent. If a node becomes inactive, it can only be
claimed in try inactive node, which transitions its
state to busy and reinitalizes its children and con-
tinuation attributes. Old child nodes that were pre-
viously stored in children thus either still see an in-
active parent before the memory barrier, or have a
version number less than the version of that parent
after the memory barrier. This allows them to reli-
ably detect their parent as invalid in both cases.
The try free node operation in Fig. 5 does not
need to be adapted for claiming nodes locally due
to this introduction of version numbers, because the
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parent node is obviously not inactive when its worker
thread is performing this operation. For stealing
nodes remotely, an additional check is necessary that
is shown in Fig. 7. Consider a worker thread attempts
to steal a free child from a node that has become
inactive, but is being reactivated, and thus transi-
tions from inactive back to busy due to the actions
of try inactive node in Fig. 6.
There are two cases to consider: Either the steal
attempt attempts to claim a child node that it
should not, because the reinitialization of the chil-
dren attribute of the parent in try inactive node
is not communicated yet; or it does not find any
child nodes although it should, because the addi-
tion of child nodes to the children attribute, which
are created when re-executing the node’s task in
try inactive node, is not communicated yet. In
the first case, the version number prevents the found
but invalid child from being chosen, and the steal
attempt just continues searching for other potential
victim nodes; in the second case, the steal attempt
completely fails, which just amounts to a longer de-
lay in finding nodes to work on in code that invokes
steal free node. It is known from the literature
that steal attempts are rare events in work-stealing
schedulers, so the effect of the increase in perfor-
mance overhead caused by such failed steal attempts
is marginal [15].
Another important aspect of Cobra is that it can
survive not only failures that occur in user code, but
also while code of the scheduler itself is being exe-
cuted. This is ensured by the fact that nodes are
only modified when worker threads are responsible
for them after successful claim or steal attempts. The
state of a node is eventually changed to done, but
only when it is completely finished, after executing
its continuation. If the thread responsible for the
node fails at any stage before, the node’s state is not
set to done, and the worker thread responsible for the
node’s parent can take over. Ensuring that working
lists and other internal data structures can always be
consistently accessed is similarly straightforward.
4 Validation and Benchmarks
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness and per-
formance of Cobra using the PARSEC 2.1 benchmark
suite, a set of multi-threaded programs for shared-
memory computers [2]. We answer two questions:
A. How well does Cobra perform?
B. What is the impact of failures?
Our benchmarks consist of the programs in PAR-
SEC 2.1 that are parallelized using the spawn/wait
primitives of Threading Building Blocks (TBB):
blackscholes, a program for calculating the pricing
of options using the Black-Scholes partial differential
equation; fluidanimate, a fluid dynamics animation
using the smoothed particle hydrodynamics method;
streamcluster, a kernel for online clustering of an in-
put stream; and swaptions, a program for pricing a
portfolio of swaptions.
We modified the programs to run on Cobra by re-
placing calls to the TBB spawn/wait primitives by
equvialent Cobra calls, but left them unchanged in
all other respects. For fluidanimate and streamclus-
ter, we also created idempotent versions of the code.
The blackscholes and swaptions programs are already
idempotent in their unchanged versions. The output
when running on Cobra was validated by comparing
it against the output when running the unchanged
programs on TBB. This confirms that running the
programs on Cobra produces correct results. All out-
put, and all benchmark numbers presented below,
are obtained using the large native input data sets
of PARSEC 2.1 that resemble real program inputs.
We ran our experiments on a Ubuntu 10.04 LTS
server with four ten-core Intel Xeon E7-4870 proces-
sors of each 2.4 GHz and 512 GB of RAM. Cobra
is implemented in C++11 and our benchmarks were
compiled using gcc-4.6.2.
4.1 Performance
We compare the timings of the benchmarks on the
work-stealing schedulers of both TBB and Cobra.
Fig. 8 shows the timings for respectively blackscholes,
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Figure 8: Cobra vs. TBB. 1) Raw execution times, showing the mean of 30 runs with a 95% confidence
interval. 2) Speedup graphs for the mean of 30 runs, using the execution on 1 thread on TBB as the baseline.
3) Relative performance graphs depicting the mean execution time per thread on Cobra normalized to the
mean execution times on TBB. The blue lines depict the geometric means of the relative performance over
all thread counts. On average, Cobra is a factor 0.95 away from TBB.
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fluidanimate, streamcluster, and swaptions. The fig-
ure shows three graphs per benchmark: a histogram
comparing the raw execution times, a speedup graph
depicting the scaling behavior, and a graph depicting
the relative performance of Cobra compared to TBB.
The histograms in Fig. 8 compare the execution
times of the benchmarks on Cobra (red) and TBB
(blue) for 1 to 32 threads. Each bar represents the
mean of 30 runs. We also show the 95% confidence
intervals for each of those means. The confidence in-
tervals are small, indicating a low variability between
the timings of the different runs. Therefore, the
speedup and relative performance graphs in Fig. 8 are
constructed using the means of the execution times.
The confidence intervals also help identifying the sta-
tistically significant differences between runtimes on
TBB and Cobra: Only the bars and intervals that
do not overlap imply a statistically significant differ-
ence.4 When there is no statistically significant differ-
ence between the mean execution time on TBB and
Cobra, the speedup and relative performance graphs
in Fig. 8 use the same means.
When comparing the timings of TBB and Cobra,
we see that Cobra is typically on par with TBB for
low thread counts (1 to 4), but faster for higher
thread counts (8 to 32), except for the streamcluster
benchmark, where the execution times are roughly
the same. This indicates that Cobra scales slightly
better than TBB in certain cases, which is also con-
firmed by the speedup graphs in Fig. 8.
The third set of graphs in Fig. 8 shows the (mean)
execution times on Cobra normalized to the (mean)
execution times on TBB (red). The normalized exe-
cution time gives a factor of how much slower/faster
Cobra is compared to TBB. For thread counts from 1
to 4, we see that Cobra is between a factor 1 and 1.06
away from TBB. For higher thread counts, Cobra is
between a factor 0.74 and 0.99 faster than TBB.
We can estimate the overall performance difference
as a single number by computing the geometric mean
of the relative performance factors [18]. These means
are also shown in the graphs with the blue lines. We
get a mean of 0.97 for blackscholes, 0.97 for fluidani-
mate, 0.98 for streamcluster, and 0.90 for swaptions.
4We also applied t-tests to verify the statistical significance.
By combining the timings for the different bench-
marks, we get a mean of 0.95, which means that, on
average, Cobra has a similar performance as TBB.
We stress that the graphs in Fig. 8 compare the
unchanged versions of the benchmarks on Cobra and
TBB, although Cobra requires parts of the code to
be idempotent to be able to recover from soft errors.
We compare the unchanged versions of the bench-
marks to focus on the relative performance of the
resilience infrastructure, without measuring the im-
pact of idempotence. For fluidanimate and stream-
cluster, which are not already idempotent in their un-
changed versions, we measured that the idempotent
variations of the code are, on average, a factor 1.08
faster than the non-idempotent versions, but this is
not shown in the graphs. We believe that the idempo-
tent code is faster because a) the idempotent coding
style improves data locality, and b) the structure of
the idempotent code can more easily be optimized by
the compiler.
4.2 Impact of failures
To investigate whether Cobra can survive hardware
failures due to soft errors, and the performance when
doing so, we set up a software-based fault injection
experiment.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
The fault-injection experiment consists of a back-
ground thread that can asynchronously signal soft
errors to worker threads using POSIX signals. This
is similar to how the OS would signal soft errors to
programs when encountering machine check excep-
tions [20]. When a worker thread receives such a
signal, it reinitializes its data structures and restarts
its scheduling loop (Section 3.3).
Our simulation takes four parameters into account
that determine the overall impact of a failure: the
percolation degree, the target, the timing, and the
frequency of failures.
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Figure 9: Impact of 1 to 1000 failures per node. 1) Raw execution times, showing the mean of 60 runs with
a 95% confidence interval. 2) Speedup graphs for the mean of 60 runs, using the execution on 1 thread
on TBB as the baseline. 3) Overhead graphs depicting the mean execution time per thread on Cobra with
1 to 1000 (simulated) failures normalized to mean execution times on Cobra without failures. Although a
conservative estimate is less than 10 failures for the benchmarks’ runtimes (Section 4.2.5), we increased the
failure rate until we got a statistically significant impact on the benchmarks’ performance.
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4.2.2 Failure percolation
In Cobra, a node restart is caused by a read ac-
cess to a poisoned memory location, which needs
to be rewritten to become unpoisoned again (Sec-
tion 2.3). In the best case, a restarted node immedi-
ately rewrites, and thus unpoisons that memory loca-
tion. In the worst case, the restarting of nodes perco-
lates up until the root node in the fork/join tree be-
fore the necessary rewrite is performed (Section 3.3).
To take this percolation into account, we do not sim-
ulate data poisoning directly, but instead simulate its
effect on the computation. To simulate the worst-case
effect, we modify the continuation of every restarted
node such that it immediately triggers another fail-
ure when it is executed, which ensures percolation up
to the root node. The root node’s continuation is not
modified, however, to ensure the overall computation
still terminates. To simulate the best-case effect, no
modification is necessary, since the computation can
just proceed after a restart in this case.
4.2.3 Failure target
Which target worker thread is selected for injecting
a failure has an impact on the overall performance.
Injecting a failure in a worker thread that is in its
steal loop, because it happens to currently have no
work of its own, has a lower impact than selecting a
worker thread that is busy with nodes deep down the
fork/join tree. In work stealing, which worker thread
works on what part of a fork/join tree is randomized.
In our failure simulation, we therefore also randomly
choose the worker threads that get failure signals. To
get a fair selection of worker threads that are failed,
we run each failure experiment thirty times and av-
erage the timings.
4.2.4 Failure Timing
The timing of a failure may have an effect on perfor-
mance. To guarantee a fair selection of failure times,
our simulation schedules failures over the average ex-
ecution time without failures, which is measured for
each benchmark and each configuration upfront.
4.2.5 Failure frequency
The frequency of failures predicted in the litera-
ture varies among different sources, but can be es-
timated using the architectural vulnerability factor
(AVF) [26]. A rough estimate is that future pro-
cessors will have a mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) of
months, but for clusters which are composed of thou-
sands of processors this is expected to result in a
MTTF of minutes [4,6,9,11,13,16,28,29]. Our bench-
marks are also in the range of minutes, so a conserva-
tive estimate is that we can expect between 1 and 10
failures. We choose to inject at least between 1 and
100 failures per experiment, and for one benchmark,
we did experiments with 1000 failures.
4.2.6 Results
Cobra survives the failures injected in our experi-
ments: It runs the benchmarks to completion and
still produces correct results in the presence of fail-
ures, confirmed by validating their output to failure-
free execution of the unchanged equivalent programs
running on TBB.
In Fig. 9, we show the impact on the performance
of our benchmarks when injecting failures according
to the above strategy. Three graphs are depicted for
each of our benchmarks: a histogram for comparing
the execution time on Cobra with 1 to 1000 failures
to the execution time on Cobra without failures, a
speedup graph to illustrate the impact of failures on
the scaling behavior, and an overhead graph showing
the execution time with failures normalized to the
failure-free execution time.
The histograms for comparing execution times de-
pict the mean of 60 runs with a 95% confidence inter-
val. The execution times without failures are those
for the idempotent versions of the benchmarks. The
confidence intervals tell us where differences with
failure-free execution are statistically relevant, and
we use this information for the speedup and overhead
graphs in Fig. 9.5
In general, as the amount of failures increases, the
execution gets slower. The impact, however, is highly
benchmark-specific. For swaptions, we already see
5We also applied t-tests to verify the significance.
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Benchmark #Trees #Failures
1 10 100 1000
Swaptions 1 1.29 2.29 2.52 n/a
Blackscholes 100 1.00 1.03 1.24 n/a
Fluidanimate 3500 1.00 1.01 1.05 n/a
Streamcluster 53460 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02
Table 1: Average slowdown per benchmark per num-
ber of failures, related to the granularity of the
fork/join computations.
statistically significant differences with failure-free
execution starting from runs with 1 failure. In con-
trast, for blackscholes and fluidanimate, it requires
at least 10 failures to see a (small) significant im-
pact. For streamcluster it takes even 1000 failures
before there is any observable impact. These dif-
ferences are due the differences in granularity of the
fork/join computations in the benchmarks. When a
failure occurs and a worker thread restarts, then in
the worst case, all fork/join computations that are
(partially) worked on by that worker thread need to
be completely restarted. So if a program generates
many short small fork/join trees, then the impact of a
failure will be lower than when a program generates
fewer, but larger and longer-lasting fork/join trees.
For example, swaptions generates exactly 1 fork/join
tree in each run, hence the impact of a single fail-
ure is high (1.2 to 1.5× slower), whereas streamclus-
ter generates 53460 fork/join trees and the impact of
1000 failures is low (1.01 to 1.05× slower). Table 1
lists the number of fork/join trees per benchmark, as
well as the average slowdown per number of failures
obtained by calculating the geometric mean of the
overhead numbers in Fig. 9.
To get an idea of how well Cobra handles failures,
we compare the numbers in Table 1 to the slowdowns
we can expect with a pure checkpoint-restart system.
Consider the case for 1 failure. Assume the execu-
tion time without failures is T . In a pure checkpoint-
restart approach, the execution time with 1 failure
is T + αT , with α a factor that determines how far
the execution progressed before the failure occurred.6
In the best case, the failure occurs at the beginning
6Assuming the restart time itself is 0, which is optimistic.
and α = 0, so the total execution time is T , as if
no failure occurred. In the worst case, the failure
occurs just before the program finishes and α = 1,
so the total execution time is 2T . However, we have
to assume that the failure occurs with equal chance
for some point in the interval [0, T ], so on average
α = 0.5 and the average execution time with 1 fail-
ure is 1.5T . With Cobra, the expected slowdown for
1 failure is a factor 1.00 to 1.29, as shown in Table 1.
This is well below the 1.5 slowdown we estimate for
a pure checkpoint-restart approach.
The above reasoning can be generalized to execu-
tions with multiple failures. Assume that, on average,
the failures are evenly distributed over the time inter-
val [0, T ]. Hence for a checkpoint-restart approach,
the execution time for n failures is
∑n+1
α=1
α
n+1T =
(1 + n2 )T . So for 10 failures, the expected execution
time is 6T , for 100 failures it is 51T , and for 1000
failures it is 501T . Table 1 shows that the slowdowns
measured with Cobra are far below these estimates.
5 Related work
5.1 Software resilience
In the field of high-performance computing, the inter-
est in fault tolerance at the software level has recently
increased due to higher software-visible failure rates
being reported for real-world clusters [9, 16, 29]. Re-
cent papers classify existing approaches according to
whether they mask failures or not, and whether they
avoid failures altogether, avoid the effects of failures,
or repair such effects [6, 7, 9].
Failure-avoiding strategies move computations
away from hardware components before they are pre-
dicted to fail. Such strategies may suffer from false
positives and false negatives, and need to be comple-
mented by other fault tolerance approaches that deal
with unpredicted failures [7].
Failure-effect avoiding strategies include, for exam-
ple, replication, ABFT, and naturally fault-tolerant
algorithms. Replication performs all computations
more than once, such that a failure can be masked
by the successful computations. ABFT augments
data structures with checksums, and computations
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on the data structures modify such checksums ac-
cordingly. Results can then be double-checked after
a computation finishes, and corrected if necessary.
Naturally fault-tolerant algorithms are designed to
handle silent errors. For example, certain classes of
iterative linear solvers can be designed such that er-
roneous values in intermediate results delay, but do
not prevent convergence to the correct result. ABFT
and naturally-fault tolerant algorithms need to be ex-
plicitly designed, and thus can be classified as non-
masking approaches [6].
Failure-effect repair is typically achieved by roll-
back recovery, with checkpointing being the most
widely used fault tolerance approach, since it has
little performance overhead for failure-free execu-
tion, and requires little involvement from applica-
tions. Writing checkpoints to secondary storage in-
curs a cost, however, and different variations of check-
pointing yield different costs at different scales [5].
Due to these costs, checkpointing is predicted to be-
come infeasible in the future if not augmented by
other techniques. There are both masking and non-
masking variants, depending on the necessary in-
volvement from applications. Forward recovery is an-
other, non-masking technique for failure-effect repair
in which applications explicitly reconstruct correct
computational states after failure [6].
According to these criteria, our notion of
restartable task graphs can be classified as a failure-
effect repair approach. Cobra currently requires com-
putations to be idempotent to ensure resilience. Ex-
cept for this restriction, Cobra does not require any
awareness of failures at the application level, and thus
can be regarded as a masking approach.
5.2 Work-stealing schedulers
In existing work-stealing schedulers, worker threads
maintain double-ended queues (deques), where work
can be locally pushed and popped on one end, and
remotely stolen from the other end. Work-first and
help-first variations of this approach differ in what
part of a computation is pushed on the thread-local
deque by a fork, and which threads will eventually
execute the continuations of suspended joins [17].
Our experiments to add resilience to exising ap-
proaches showed that work-first schedulers make it
difficult to determine which threads need to check
which parts of the fork/join tree, and which sus-
pended joins need to be dropped in the presence of
failures. On the other hand, help-first schedulers tra-
ditionally use the native call stack for maintaining
continuations, and may therefore induce a long delay
before noticing a failed subcomputation when it is
“hidden” by other computations deeper down in the
same call stack. Cobra is a variation of a help-first
scheduler that, however, uses an explicit representa-
tion of the fork/join tree, which allows for checking
any of its dependencies at any time.
In current work-stealing schedulers, a successful at-
tempt at stealing work implies that it is immediately
removed from the victim deque. In Cobra, stolen
tasks are not immediately removed, but only flagged,
so that parent nodes can check the liveness of child
nodes. On top of that, existing work-stealing sched-
ulers use fork counters to determine how many tasks
are unfinished. Such fork counters are inherently non-
idempotent, and thus Cobra avoids them to ensure
that the scheduler code itself is resilient as well.
6 Conclusions
To deal with the increasing reliability issues at the
hardware level, we propose to model computations
in terms of restartable task graphs, so that failures
can be handled in software. As a proof of con-
cept, we present Cobra, a novel design for shared-
memory work stealing that implements the notion
of restartable task graphs and makes it possible for
computations to recover from soft errors.
In Cobra, the scheduler maintains an explicit rep-
resentation of tasks and tracks the dependencies be-
tween tasks. This allows for restarting any task
whose execution is interrupted by a failure. As a
fault detection mechanism, we rely on the machine
check architecture, a modern processor design that
can signal software-recoverable failures to the oper-
ating system. The Cobra scheduler responds to such
machine check exceptions triggered upon detecting
soft errors by searching for the task that rewrites the
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poisoned memory location. This task cannot be de-
termined upfront, and thus the scheduler starts by
re-executing the task that was initially interrupted.
If this task does not override the poisoned memory,
another machine check exception is triggered, and the
scheduler attempts to restart a parent of the task in-
stead. This repeats until, eventually, a task is re-
executed that fixes the cause of the failure. This
restart mechanism for tasks is integrated as part of
the regular scheduling loop, and therefore incurs little
performance overhead.
As a validation, we executed the programs of the
PARSEC benchmark suite that are based on Thread-
ing Building Blocks (TBB) on top of a C++11 imple-
mentation of Cobra. Comparison of failure-free exe-
cution with the work-stealing scheduler of TBB shows
that Cobra is, on average, a factor 0.95 away from
TBB. This indicates that the performance of both
schedulers is very similar. We also set up a software-
based fault-injection experiment. Our experiments
confirm that Cobra executes programs correctly both
with and without failure injection. We also observe
that injecting failures yields an acceptable slowdown.
For 1 failure we see a slowdown of 1.00 to 1.29 and
for 100 failures a slowdown of 1.00 to 2.52, which is
only a fraction of what can be expected with a con-
ventional checkpoint-restart approach.
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